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Article 6

REBECCA JUDGE

Hope in a Period of Economic Decline
We’re certainly going through a period that puts the “dismal” in
the dismal science otherwise known as economics. The unemployment rate has doubled over the last eighteen months as the
economy has lost 6.5 million jobs, with more job losses expected
in the near future. Most reasonable economic forecasts predict
that the nation’s unemployment rate, presently at 9.6 percent,
will reach and even exceed 10 percent before the year’s end. The
long-term unemployment rate is now at 5.1 percent, meaning that over half of the people who have lost jobs during this
economic downturn have been without a salary for more than
fifteen weeks. The downturn has affected not only income, but
wealth. Household wealth has decreased by about 50 percent
between 2004 and 2009, hitting older households hardest.
Families headed by individuals between the ages of 55 and 64
saw the median value of their assets decline from $315,000 in
2004 to just $160,000 in 2009, changing the retirement plans of
a generation of baby boomers (Rosnick and Baker 1). While our
leaders look for green shoots and lights at the end of tunnels, we
are left to console ourselves by finding hope in the fact that the
rate of our descent into the economic abyss of unemployment,
foreclosure, and bankruptcy seems to be decreasing, even as the
descent itself continues.
Some solace, if not genuine hope, is offered by the fact that
we’ve been here before. The unemployment rate reached 10.8 percent in November 1982 at the depths of the last big recession. But
twelve months later, the unemployment rate had decreased by two
percentage points, and by 1987, it had returned to its pre-recession
level of 5.9 percent. The central message of Recession 101, a national
billboard campaign introduced this June, is that the single most
interesting fact about recessions is that they indeed end.

But, to me at least, this recession seems different. Maybe it’s
my age. In 1982, I was in the second year of my Ph.D. program.
I had very little income as a research assistant, but I also had
neither debts nor responsibilities to anyone but myself. Twentyseven years later, I am ten years from what I thought was to be
my retirement age. I have income on which I’ve grown dependent and a job that I would hate to lose. I have a house that has
lost twenty percent of its assessed value in the last year, a child
starting college, another one starting high school, and a retirement account whose value decreases even as I continue to plough
more into it each month. I studied the last recession; I experience this one.
No doubt these altered circumstances explain away much of
the difference in the public’s attitude towards this most recent
recession. In the years since 1982, a generation of baby boomers
like myself have matured, launched careers, and accumulated
wealth and houses and children and parents who need extended
and expensive care. But I don’t think that a generational life-cycle
model alone explains the panic that has gripped the nation since
September of 2008 when within a single month Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac collapsed; Merrill Lynch was purchased at fire-sale
prices; Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy; the president,
warning that “our entire economy is in danger,” asked Congress
for $700 billion to relieve private financial institutions of their
bad debts; and the stock market suffered the largest one-day
decline in history. Sure, recessions happen, but this one seems
bigger, and scarier, than any that our generation has experienced.
This panic, the one that presidents and billboards alike are
trying to address and assuage, this heightened social sensitivity to increases in unemployment and decreases in the value of
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stocks, is not, I believe, the result of hypersensitivity on the part
of baby boomers to the regular peaks and troughs of a business
cycle. The panic that accompanies this recession, which was
largely absent from the last, results from the fact that many of us
are genuinely and profoundly surprised at this recession’s mere
existence. We had been told, and we sincerely believed, that this
recession was never going to happen. In July, 2004, Washington
Post columnist George Will proclaimed that “the economic
problem, as understood during two centuries of industrialization, has been solved. We can reliably produce economic growth
and have moderated business cycles.” Industry deregulation,
globalized markets, tepid governmental regulation of commerce,
the environment, and financial institutions, and the inscrutable
monetary policy of Alan Greenspan had created a squeeze chute
which effectively, we thought, corralled the economy, constraining its movements to a few harmless bucks and kicks. Our panic
in the face of this recession is the panic the rodeo crowd experiences when the bull breaks out of its squeeze chute, gores its
handlers, and charges the stands.
And it is in this adrenalized response to the charging bull
that I find the possibility for hope in this period of economic
decline. Having experienced the destructive capacity of this wild
bull market, we might be inclined to favor one of the breed’s
more docile hybrids.
I do not mean, by choice of metaphor or example, to disparage market systems in which owners of private property are free
to exchange their goods and services. But I do hope that my
metaphor of a charging bull highlights the danger Paul Tillich
found embedded in the bourgeois principle that “the free flow
of human productive forces will lead inevitably to a rational
formation of society.” (49) Charging bulls are not rational.
Furthermore, we neglect our obligation to our neighbors in the
rodeo audience if we dismiss their injuries with a crude utilitarianism that compares the costs inflicted by the bull to the benefits he generates for his owners. Markets, as most economists
are fond of saying, are amoral, without morals. We fail in our
moral duties when we allow these amoral institutions to have the
final say in determining our neighbor’s welfare.
A Lutheran understanding of our role as economic agents
needs to be grounded in the consideration of the impact of our
actions on our neighbors. In contrast to Calvin, who largely
supported the economic institutions of the day, Luther railed
against a self-interested norm for market behavior. Writing on
“Trade and Usury” in 1524, Luther observes that
The merchants have among themselves one common rule,
which is their chief maxim and the basis of all their sharp
practices. They say: I may sell my goods as dear as I can. This

they think their right. Lo, that is giving place to avarice and
opening every door and window to hell. What does it mean?
Only this: ‘I care nothing about my neighbor; so long as I
have my profit and satisfy my greed, what affair is it of mine
if it does my neighbor ten injuries at once?’…. On this basis
trade can be nothing else than robbing and stealing other
people’s property. (“Trade and Usury” 87)
Instead of selling dear, Luther recommends that concerns for
the neighbor dominate market transactions, writing that,
your selling ought not to be a work that is entirely within your
own power and will, without law or limit, as though you were
a god and beholden to no one; but because this selling of yours
is a work that you perform toward your neighbor, it must be so
governed by law and conscience, that you do it without harm
and injury to your neighbor, and that you be much more concerned to do him no injury than to make large profits. (88)
The raging bull of the market is to be constrained by considerations of its impact on others.
Now, in fairness to Luther and to history, I need to point out
that the “law and limit” Luther would impose on merchants
does not originate with the nation state. Government intervention into the marketplace was, according to Luther, “not to be
hoped for,” as “we Germans are too busy with drinking and
dancing to give heed to such regulation.” (89). Instead of answering to secular authorities, Luther’s merchant answers to God.
The sale of goods is itself a work that is subject to the vocational
call that sanctifies all human effort. As such, its practice is
bound by concerns for neighbor.
But who is my neighbor? Should I be concerned for my fellow
Minnesotans? My fellow Americans? My fellow human beings?
And how do I translate my concerns for my neighbor’s welfare
into my own market transactions in this global market place? In
a consumer society, is consumption itself an act of vocation, and
if so, does it matter if I buy free trade coffee or the house brand?
And how do these questions relate to the more immediate
question of finding hope in a period of economic decline, or the
broader question of the vocation of the Lutheran college?
The Lutheran understanding of market transactions as works
that we perform toward our neighbor expands the boundaries of economic analysis beyond the consideration of economic
efficiency, forcing us to consider explicitly the personal, social,
and distributional impacts of markets and market allocations.
This means that we need to examine, with some suspicion, the
analytical framework common to economics that justifies sweat
shop labor, for example, by casting the tradeoff between prostitution and sweatshops as analogous to the choice between pizza and
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subway sandwiches (Marglin 225). In both cases, the rational utility maximizer simply chooses the option that promises to generate
the greatest happiness; economics recognizes no moral difference
embodied in either choice. In the words of Larry Summers (2003),
“as long as the workers are voluntarily employed, they have chosen
to work [in the sweatshop] because they are working to their best
alternative.” But a Lutheran understanding of market transactions
as works subject to a vocational call demands that we consider our
duty to those who labor for us. Through duty to each other, the
worker in the shoe factory and the consumer who purchases the
pair of athletic shoes are linked in a way that is not reflected in
the economic model of individual utility maximizers. A Lutheran
understanding of market transactions explicitly acknowledges
that linkage, and the responsibilities it imposes.
The Lutheran understanding of vocation as extending into all
aspects of our work in this world, including our market transactions, means that we need to be particularly mindful of the
biases and distortions introduced into economic analysis by the
discipline’s two traditional reference points: the highly stylized,
rational, utility-maximizing individual and the nation-state. The
individual who serves as the reference point for economic analysis,
Homo economicus, is like one of those new Japanese robots in
that, while bearing a striking resemblance to humankind, it
seems to be missing some critical parts. Homo economicus goes
about its days, rationally choosing between pizza and submarine
sandwiches, eight hours of prostitution or eight hours in the
sweatshop, calculating with amazing precision the total amount of
“utils” generated by each activity, and, by applying the appropriate
discount rate, is able to attain the maximum amount of happiness
by the time its battery loses its charge. This life narrative for Homo
economicus reduces our moral obligation to nothing other than
assuring that it is given as much choice as possible. As only Homo
economicus knows which choices will maximize its happiness, the
rest of us would be wrong to force economicus to consume so many
calories a day of protein, or so many units of education, or so many
square feet of housing, if doing so reduces the amount of income
economicus has to spend other goods. Our duties to each other as
individuals are simply reduced to the avoidance of activities that
restrict others’ choices. Furthermore, since in a market economy,
choice is limited by income, society fulfills its obligation to its
members by maximizing the income generated within that society. This means that the nation-state dispenses its moral obligations by subjecting its decisions to cost-benefit analysis, which is
itself limited to the consideration of only those costs and benefits
accruing to the citizens of the nation state.
During the economic expansion that preceded the recent
and precipitous market decline, critics of this sort of economic
fundamentalism were mostly dismissed as either idealistic or
28 | Intersections | Spring 2010

unschooled. As nothing succeeds like success, the economic
model credited with providing the roadmap that guided our
ever-expanding trajectory was increasingly relied upon. To
paraphrase from Karl Polanyi, social values in the United States
at the beginning of the twenty-first century were corroded by “a
crude utilitarianism combined with an uncritical reliance on the
alleged self-healing virtues of unconscious growth” (33). Benefitcost analysis became the order of the day as federal regulations
of all types were forced to prove their merits on the basis of the
relative magnitude of their impacts on the economy. Economic
values trumped other commitments in the areas of workplace
safety, environmental protection, energy policy, and consumer
product safety. The crude utilitarianism that forms the basis
of benefit-cost analysis was used to justify everything from
privatizing social security to refusing to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, to water-boarding. And all of this is the result of an
allegedly moral commitment to expand the choices available to
a humanoid known as Homo economicus.

“.... encouraging another national
conversation concerning our moral
obligations to one another.”
Even as the Great Depression created the political environment that replaced laissez-faire with the New Deal, this recent
downturn holds the possibility of encouraging another national
conversation concerning our moral obligations to one another as
fellow citizens, as fellow beings created in God’s image, and fellow
souls reconciled to God through Jesus’ death and resurrection.
It’s a conversation that I believe our Lutheran colleges are well
suited for as intellectual heirs to both the rich understanding of
vocation that is one of Lutheranism’s gifts to moral discourse, and
the doctrine of the two kingdoms. Together, these two intellectual traditions provide a space for a discussion of our duties to
each other which is necessarily constrained and informed by the
explicit recognition of our plurality and diversity.
The depth and breadth of this recent economic downturn
has exposed some of the folly of trusting in markets and market
valuations alone to provide for our physical needs. Government
is also necessary. As Luther instructs in his Large Catechism,
“although we have received from God all good things in abundance, we cannot retain any of them or enjoy them in security
and happiness unless he gives us a stable, peaceful government.”
(430).

Our ability to retain and use God’s abundant gifts to us
depends on government, not markets. Governments may use
markets as tools to accomplish their purposes, but they need to
be careful to avoid surrendering their purposes to these tools.
The hope to be found in this recent economic decline is that we
recognize and reclaim our role as active moral agents called to
serve our neighbor in all of our interactions, even—or perhaps
particularly—those taking place in the market.
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